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 ABSTRACT 
Since the early Zionist settlement project in Palestine, water resource management systems 
have been employed by the Israeli nation-building project. This research explores the 
development of Israeli approaches to water resource management that enabled the 
implementation of spatial planning patterns and water infrastructure projects. I argue that 
this implementation has led to a nation-building project that pivots around two central 
issues; the first is controlling the movement and livelihoods of Palestinian people while 
detaching them from their natural environment, as discussed through the case of Al Battouf 
Valley (a Galilean region). The second is the transformation of nature where Israel sought to 
control nature in the service of the nation-state. 
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PREFACE 
“You distanced yourself from yourself. 
So that you might remain on the land. 
You will remain. 
(People were useless … the land was useless) 
But you'll dwell on. 
And in the land, there is nothing, nothing but you 
and what remained of time's struggles 
after the miserable seasons' removal 
*** 
Sadder than water 
and clearer than the summer sun. 
But the ripeness of the spikes of wheat 
chooses its appointed time, after the barren seasons. 
Therefore, plead for a loaf of bread 
from your local relief agency - 
forget the rest of your meal for a while. 
Clear up your appraisal: day by day. 
Month by month. And year by year. 
Make clear the sudden atmosphere 
before the explosion of your call. 
You are the caller and you are the called. 
You went up in flames. Were extinguished. Began. 
You retreated. And discovered the land. 
And then you lost it. 
Sadder than water.”   
Sadder Than Water | Samih Al-Qasim.  
Translated by: Nazih Kassis 
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  تغّربَت منك. لتمكث في الأرض"
 أنت ستمكث
 (لم ينفع الناس.. لم تنفع الأرض)
 لكن ستمكث أنت،
ي ء فيها سواك،
ي الأرض، لا ش 
 
ي ء ف
 ولا ش 
 وما ظّل من شظف الوقت،
 بعد انحسار مواسمها البائسة
 ***
ا
ً
 من الماء حزن
ّ
 أشد
 وأوضح من شمس تّموز. لكّن نضج السنابل
  الفصوليختار ميعاده بعد عقِم 
ا من الخب   
ً
ي وكالة غوثك شيئ
 
 إذن فالتمس ف
.. تحّر التقاويم: يوًما فيوًما
ا
 وانَس الإدام قليلً
 وشهًرا فشهًرا. وعاًما فعاما. تحّر المناخ المفاج  ئ ،
ى
َ
 قبل انفجار ندائك. أنت المنادي وأنت المناد
 وأنت اشتعلت. انطفأت.. ابتدأت
 انكفأت.. وأنت اكتشفت البلاد.. وأنت
  قدت البلادف
ا"
ً
 من الماء حزن
ّ
 أشد
ا
ً
 من الماء حزن
ّ
القاسم سميح |أشد
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Introduction 
Among the many aspects of spatial planning, water resource management systems are one 
of the central tools that secured the establishment of the Israeli nation-state. They were 
employed politically since the early Zionist settlement project in Palestine1. For achieving 
the nation-building project, the Israeli management of water resources defied nature and 
transformed its order, even as it detached native Palestinians, citizens of Israel2, from their 
natural environment.  
 
 
Figure 1: Borders of Israel-Palestine. 
From historic Palestine geography governed by the British Mandate, through the United Nation (UN) partition plan in 
19473, to the establishment of Israel in 1948, to the six-days war’s result in 1967 until today.  
Source: Palestine Portal 
 
Soon after I began my research on Israeli water resource management systems, I interviewed 
an old Palestinian couple in their house in Arraba. Arraba is a Palestinian town in the Galilee 
that falls within the northern district of the Israeli state. The couple are peasants who own 
agricultural land in Al Battouf Valley, through which the Israeli National Water Carrier (NWC) 
project cuts. In the 1950s, when Arraba and all Palestinian villages were military governed, 
                                                 
1 The territorial boundaries of Palestine and Israel have been shifted many times during the past decades (See Figure 1). In 
this paper when I talk about the period before 1948 (the establishment of Israel) I will talk about historic Palestine- the area 
under the British Mandate between 1918-1948. 
2 Palestinians, who remained within the borders of the newly established country of Israel after 1948, have got an Israeli 
citizenship. However, they are not treated as equal citizens and are considered a demographic and national threat to the 
Israeli country. This paper will touch on some aspects of this issue.  
3 According to the partition plan a Jewish state would cover more than 50% of Palestine’s lands, while Jews in Palestine 
were only 33% of the total population.  
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the man was temporarily expelled because he resisted the digging of a water canal for the 
NWC through his land. During the interview, as we talked about this water project that 
crosses their lands but neither irrigates it nor solves its flood problems, it started to rain. The 
woman started to pray: "Please God, stop the rain".  A peasant, living on rainfed agriculture, 
was praying for the rain to stop.  
My research is driven by trying to understand what drove this fear of rain, the most desired 
natural event in any semi-arid region. What happened through the years to create this 
alienation between peasants and nature? How did Israeli water management projects, 
transform nature to build the Israeli nation? And what happened to Palestinians, citizens of 
Israel, as a result of this? 
In this research paper I study the implementation of water resources management systems 
that served the Israeli nation building project since the British Mandate in Palestine. I start 
by examining two main Israeli approaches to water, the first is the abundance of water 
theory that justified Jewish immigration to Palestine during the British Mandate (Chapter 1). 
The second approach is the scarcity of water discourse that was employed by the new Israeli 
state, starting in the 1950s, to establish a centralized water system and a state monopoly 
over nature (Section 2.1). Together, these two stages, undergird the Israeli nation-building 
project and enabled spatial planning patterns and water infrastructure projects evident 
today (Sections 2.2-2.3). Water resources management was a primary political instrument 
to achieve the Israeli nation-building project and it was built on two central pivots; the first 
was controlling the movement and livelihoods of Palestinian people and detaching them 
from their natural environment, as discussed through the Al Battouf Valley case4  (Section 
2.4). The second was the transformation of nature (Sections 2.5 to 3) where, Israel, similar 
to many other modern countries, sought to control nature in the service of the nation-state. 
                                                 
4 This research focuses on Palestinians citizens of Israel and does not touch on water issues in the West Bank or Gaza.  
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Worster (1992) has discussed in some detail, how massive water projects and scientific 
expertise served to establish bureaucratic control even in the ‘democratic’ West. Katie 
Meehan (2014), quoting Karl Wittfogel (1957), explains the rise of centralized authority in 
‘despotic’ regimes through the emergence of dams, canals, and irrigation technologies. She 
writes,  
State agencies used scientific instruments and reports to render water legible 
to administration and planning: maps were drawn, data were collected, 
deficiencies were calculated, wetlands were drained, rivers were dammed, 
and reservoirs built to ‘conserve’ water for navigation and beneficial uses—
largely at the behest of a capitalist state (Meehan, 2014).  
This control over nature and water was not separate from control over local Palestinians. In 
the context of the U.S., historian Edward E. Baptist (2010 and 2016), records the approach 
towards nature by which settlers to North America transformed the homeland of its 
indigenous people into land as a resource to be exploited for the sake of territorial control 
and economic development. This geographical transformation, along with the system of 
slavery, created the two main “commodities” that later generated the wealth of the settlers: 
land and human bodies. Owning this commodity capital was essential for the establishment 
of the capitalist system and its current characteristics.  Although the American system of 
slavery was not established in Palestine, two "commodities" were created and controlled: 
human (Palestinian) bodies and natural resources that were transformed for the national 
project benefiting the privileged in power. 
  
 4 
 
1. The Water Issue Under the British Mandate 1918-1948  
The Zionist movement5 started envisioning water projects in Palestine decades before the 
official establishment of the Israeli state in 1948. Some of the projects focused on the local 
management scale for serving the Jewish immigrants’ settlements in Palestine and others 
were at a nation-wide scale that set the ground for a larger immigration project.  The chapter 
examines the water issue during the British Mandate. It discusses the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict prior to the establishment of the Israeli state and how water played into this conflict. 
1.1 Balfour Declaration 1917 
Palestine was governed by the Ottoman Empire for four centuries before the Empire’s 
collapse as a result of the First World War in 1918. The British took over Palestine through 
the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration until 1920, then a civilian administration, 
headed by a High Commissioner, replaced the military administration. In 1922, The Great 
Britain administrative forces achieved legitimacy for their continued control by obtaining a 
mandate from the League of Nations. 
Discussions, agreements and debates dealing with the partition of the Ottoman Empire 
started right after the end of the First World War (e.g. the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916, 
Balfour Declaration of 1917, the 1915–16 Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, and League 
of Nations Mandate). During this unstable era, in November 1917, the British government 
issued a public statement announcing support for the establishment of a "national home for 
the Jewish people" in Palestine:  
His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of 
a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
                                                 
5 A nationalist movement of Jewish people that emerged in the late 19th century in Central and Eastern Europe as a result 
of the risen anti-Semitism, and along with other nationalist movement around the world. It supported the establishing of a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine and supported Jewish immigration there.  
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nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status 
enjoyed by Jews in any other country. (Balfour, 1917) 
This letter (See Figure 2) from the United Kingdom's Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, to 
Lord Rothschild, a prominent Zionist leader, is known as The Balfour Declaration. It is 
considered to be the first public support of the Zionist Organization by the British 
Government, and the first pledge for building a “Jewish national home” in Palestine, where 
the Jewish population made up 7.9% of the at the time (See Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Balfour Declaration 1917 
 
The term “national home,” that was promised to the Zionist Organization through The 
Balfour Declaration, was left internationally unrecognized (Makovsky, 2007, p.76). Despite 
the ambiguity of the term, Zionist leaders perceived it, bolstered by the context of the 
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declaration, to intend the formation of a Jewish state. Weizmann6, for example, considered 
the development of a state to be a way for the Jews to slowly become a majority group in 
Palestine. Furthermore, Balfour himself, privately announced in 1918: “My personal hope is 
that Jews will make good in Palestine and eventually found a Jewish State” (Makovsky, 2007, 
p.77). On the other hand, some argue that rather than representing a claim for an 
independent state, the declaration embodied a claim that was consistently made from the 
very first days of the Zionist movement: that a European protected space in colonial territory 
will solve the European (and globalizing) Jewish problem (Loevy,2017). This ambiguity as well 
as the promises by the British Mandate for self-determination for Palestinians caused a great 
deal of confusion and brought the region to a heated tension between the three major 
players; the colonial British government, Palestinians seeking self-determination and 
independence from the colonial government, and the Zionist movement seeking a Jewish 
state.  
The next two sections (Sections 1.2 and 1.3) discuss how the management of water resources 
and infrastructure projects served Jewish immigration to Palestine.  
1.2 Jewish Immigration as an Economic Question 
Despite British support for building the Jewish national home in Palestine, many debates 
around Jewish immigration policy started between the Zionist Organization and the British 
during the British Mandate. The capacity of water resources was one of the main 
considerations to achieving the desired Zionist immigration volume.  
After Balfour’s declaration and under the British Mandate, Jewish immigration to Palestine 
grew significantly, from 7.9% by 1918 to 33% by 1946 as shown in Figure 3. 
                                                 
6 A Zionist leader and the first president of Israel. 
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Figure 3: The Jews and Arab population of Palestine (1914-1946). 
Source: israelipalestinian.procon.org 
 
The Zionist movement advocated for immigration of millions of Jewish people to Palestine. 
In 1922, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill issued a White Paper, a 
government policy document, which reiterated British support for the Balfour Declaration, 
but also attributed tensions in Palestine to “exaggerated interpretations” of the Declaration, 
clarifying its intent to mean that while the “Jewish national home” is to be established in 
Palestine, that does not mean Palestine is to be wholly Jewish. It stressed that the Jewish 
immigration “cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic 
capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrival.” (Churchill, 1922)  
This document, issued by the British, altered the immigration discussion to a technical 
question (Alatout, 2009) by referring to the economic capacity of Palestine rather than 
dealing merely with the political intention.  
Later, in 1939, a new British White Paper was issued by Malcolm MacDonald, the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies. Following the conclusions of the Peel7 and Woodhead8 
                                                 
7 A British commission of inquiry that was appointed in 1937 to survey the situation in Palestine. It recommended the 
partition of Palestine into three parts: a Jewish state, a territory under British administration and an area to be annexed to 
Transjordan (Peel, 1937). 
8 It was a technical commission that drew up 3 detailed plans for the partition of Palestine following the Peel Commission 
report. Its report was issued in 1938. (Woodhead, 1938) 
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Commissions, as well as the ongoing Arab Revolt, the paper rejected the idea of partition of 
Palestine and suggested the establishment of an independent state in Palestine, with Arabs 
and Jews sharing the government, all within ten years. (MacDonald, 1939).  
For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be 
allowed […] if economic absorptive capacity permits. In addition, as a 
contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 
refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that 
adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured. […] After the period of 
five years, no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs 
of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it. (MacDonald, 1939).  
This Paper severely limited Jewish immigration to Palestine, suggesting that it is 
unsustainable and that it would soon overwhelm the available water resources for 
agriculture and other uses. British economists believed that the entire geographic area of 
Palestine could hold no more than two million people. So, it limited the number of Jewish 
immigrants to 75,000 over five years, as opposed to the plan of absorbing one million 
immigrants to Palestine within 18 months that was suggested by David Ben-Gurion, the 
political leader of the Jewish community in Palestine (Siegel, 2015).  
While the two papers (1922 and 1939) outraged Zionist leaders, they also represented an 
opportunity to alter the discussion around Jewish immigration to Palestine to a technical 
issue. Zionists leaders insisted that the absorptive capacity of Palestine should be the only 
legitimate factor in determining the Jewish immigration policies. Technical reports, issued 
by the Zionists to justify the extension of Jewish immigration to Palestine, included a range 
of Zionist action in Palestine: Farming, industry, mineral resources, and, especially important, 
water research and use (Alatout, 2009). 
Technicizing the question - a term used by Alatout (Alatout, 2009) to mean “tying it to 
measurable absorptive capacity” - placed immigration policies firmly in the hands of the 
Mandatory Government rather than of the Zionist movement. However, the Zionist 
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movement saw this as an opportunity to contest British estimates of Palestine’s absorptive 
capacity as technically unsound (Alatout, 2009). Alatout argues, according to the theorists of 
power such as Foucault and Science, Technology and Society scholars especially Jasanoff, 
that the technical discourse around water was already shaped by politics, it is a framework 
of power, a resource for declaring winners and losers. He adds that by technicizing the 
question of immigration, it was shifted to the number of immigrants rather than whether 
immigration should be allowed at all and under whose authority.   
This stage, following the Papers, was the first stage of politicizing water resources in 
Palestine, and the White Paper of 1939 is seen as a starting point in understanding the 
modern State of Israel’s approach to managing water resources (Seigel, 2015). To answer 
the question of necessary water capacity for the hoped Jewish immigration, the Zionist 
movement worked on establishing different plans and projects to make the “national Jewish 
home” possible; the many research projects and many plans clearly suggested that water in 
Palestine is an abundant resource that can meet the Zionist immigration needs.   
1.3 Water’s Abundance and Projects: Justification for Jewish Immigration   
Natural water resources are among the debated issues when it comes to the natural 
absorptive capacity of Palestine, that is a semi-arid climate zone. The rainwater and the 
melting snow (mainly from Mt. Hermon) enter the upper Jordan River and flow into Sea of 
Galilee (Lake Tiberias), shaping the main natural surface-water resource in Palestine. The 
lake is also fed partly by underground springs. Another two natural-water resources are the 
Coastal and the Mountain aquifers (see  
Figure 4).  The average annual natural recharge of the basins is about 1800 mcm/year (million 
cubic meters per year), more than 80% of this is shared by three basins: The upper Jordan 
 10 
 
River and the Sea of Galilee (600 mcm/year), the Mountain Aquifer (660 mcm/year), and the 
Coastal Aquifer (240 mcm/year) (Schwarz et al., 2015). 
Those sources are primarily dependent on annual replenishment through rainfall. This is 
problematic because of various factors, the most important being the short-term climatic 
variability and the possibility of longer-term periods of significant declines resulting from 
prolonged drought (Lithwick, 2000).  
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Figure 4: Water resources in Israel-Palestine. 
Source: https://water.fanack.com/israel/water-resources/ 
 
At the time the British White Paper was issued in May 1939, water was managed mostly at 
the local scale and mostly constituted of wells’ dug in towns and farms, and was a balkanized, 
‘district-by-district’ affair with very little sharing or pooling of common resources (Seigel 
2015). This approach to water was not sufficient to meet the Zionist’s expansion plans, 
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especially given that most of the available water volume is in the North. The North was far 
from the planned metropolis of Tel Aviv and from the desert of the Negev, the desired area 
that David Ben-Gurion was dreaming of settling (see section 2.2.1). Hence, a more convincing 
plan had to be presented as a counter argument for the White Paper.  
Under these conditions, the abundance theory (Alatout, 2009), on water availability, evolved 
into technical water projects’ proposals and hydrological scientific discussion (See Alatout, 
2009), and biblical arguments to justify the Jewish immigration.  
Simcha Blass is a Polish Jewish hydrological engineer that immigrated to Palestine, and a 
water consultant for the Jewish Agency in Palestine. In 1939 he was asked to create a 
“fantasy water plan” to be presented to the British to justify expanding the number of Jewish 
immigrants.  The many drafts of Blass’ plan suggested 1) the abundance of groundwater in 
the Negev desert, 2) pumping water from the Yarkon River9, and 3) developing a massive 
infrastructure project to carry the water from the water-rich north to the center and the 
south. He included the Yarmouk River (in Jordan today) and the Litani River (Lebanon) in his 
plan, as the map on the cover book shows(see Figure 5); His plan crossed the boundaries of 
today’s Israel and suggested reaching Lebanon, Jordan, and the West Bank. Blass’ plan, 
became the first draft of the Israeli National Water Carrier (explained in detail in section 2.3 
below) and was part of Ben-Gurion’s negotiation with the British about the Jewish 
immigration to Palestine (Seigel 2015).  
                                                 
9 A river in the central region of the country that flows into the Mediterranean Sea. 
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Figure 5: A Scheme of the water carrier project in Blass’ book “Water Treasures in Israel”, 1942. 
 
Another support to the Zionist argument of water abundance was provided by the American 
soil scientist Walter C. Lowdermilk, who used both scientific and biblical arguments to prove 
the high absorptive capacity of “Palestine, the Land of Promise”10. Lowdermilk, who worked 
at the American Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), was sponsored by the Mandate 
Government to research the construction of an airport (Alatout, 2009). He extended his visit 
                                                 
10 A biblical title of Lowdermilk’s book that was published in 1939. 
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and visited three hundred farms, settlements, and outposts of the Yishuv11 (Seigel, 2015). 
Lowdermilk was a member of the mainly Christian pro-Zionist American Palestine 
Committee, and a friend of Blass. The Jewish Agency capitalized on this opportunity and 
provided Lowdermilk with all possible assistance during his visit. It ended with the 
publication of his best-seller book “Palestine, Land of Promise” in 1939 which became the 
most influential study of Palestine's water availability and use during the Mandate period 
(Alatout, 2009). It also had a deep impact on the embryonic thoughts about the Zionist effort 
among US policy elites (Seigel, 2015). 
In his book, Lowdermilk proposed a nation-wide infrastructure project, driven by the model 
of the TVA project he was familiar with12. He suggested diverting the Jordan River from the 
North to the desert of the Negev in the South, and proposed the JVA, the Jordan Valley 
Authority. According to Lowdermilk, this project could support a population of 4 million 
people in Palestine. This technical project was backed up with another two arguments that 
supported the notion of abundance; The first was that “the absorptive capacity of any 
country is a dynamic and expanding conception. It changes with the ability of the population 
to make maximum use of its land, and to put its economy on a scientific and productive 
basis.” (Lowdermilk, 1939). This argument presented the Arabs as pre-modern inhabitants 
who could not make beneficial use of the great land13, vis-a-vis the Jewish immigrants, whose 
work was remarkable14. Further, his second argument for establishing the water abundance 
theory was the biblical stories about Palestine, depicting it as a green and wealthy land.  
                                                 
11 The Jewish community in Palestine prior to the establishment of Israel. 
12 “The Tennessee Valley Authority has set the pattern whereby agriculture, power and manufacturing can be developed in 
a co-ordinated way in the highest interests of the people in a given area. This pattern should be applied to Palestine. The 
drainage area of the Jordan Valley, the Hauran and the maritime slopes of Palestine, has the physical features and resources 
that set the stage for a great reclamation project” (Lowdermilk, 1939, p.24) 
13 For example: “Suspicious-looking Arabs stood around their tents […] We were careful to travel faster than a racer camel, 
in order that news of our approach should not be passed to terrorist groups along the roads.” (p.4), or “Backward native 
populations and political and social decay are the usual result when land is impoverished” (p.21) 
14 For example: “The Jewish settlers in Palestine has similarly transformed “bad lands.”” (p.221) 
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2. Building the National State of Israel: From a Discourse of Scarcity to Drought 
In 1948, the Israeli-Arab war came to an end with the establishment of Israel (see Figure 1). 
700,000 of the local Palestinians were expelled or fled, and more than 500 of their villages 
were demolished. Some Palestinians whose villages were not demolished, or who were 
displaced internally, remained within the newly declared borders of the new county under 
military governed areas. With this takeover of Palestinian land, the new Israeli state started 
to establish a nation, both on the spatial and the structural level.   
This chapter will examine the shift of the Israeli state’s discourse of water abundance into a 
water scarcity discourse and its political implementation at the scale of a national project 
(section 2.1).  Then, I will introduce how spatial planning policies (section 2.2), supported by 
the water management system and infrastructure (section 2.3), shaped the national state of 
Israel, detached Palestinians’ from their lands (section 2.4), overlooked nature, and led to an 
actual water drought (section 2.5).  
2.1 Discourse of Scarcity  
As we saw in the previous chapter, the discourse of abundance was the main argument 
among Zionist engineers and politicians during the period of the British Mandate.  Alatout 
argues that in politically constructing the water resources of Palestine as abundant, in 
scientific and political discourse, a particular politics of Jewish immigration was allowed. 
However, this discourse of abundance changed dramatically after the establishment of Israel 
in 1948, and instead, became a discourse of scarcity. 
By the time of declaring the establishment of Israel in 1948, the population of the new 
country was only around 872,000 people. Only 13% of the natural water resources were 
used, then, for agricultural use, drinking, and urban consumption, and water was supplied, 
on a local level, either from close surface resources or wells (Schwarz et al., 2015). However, 
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the following period of development of the newly-established country was shaped by rapid 
development of agricultural, industrial and urban sectors. Within 10 years, the population 
size doubled due to immigration (See Figure 32), and the demand for water increased. This 
required a national level of operation and switched the discourse of abundance into a 
discourse of scarcity. Water management was not about “creating” water resources, rather 
it was about managing the existing water resources. According to Alatout (2008), the new 
discourse of water scarcity helped to construct the following: 
water resource scarcity as `fact'; centralized policy-making institutions as 
most `efficient'; centralized technologies as `appropriate'; the national space 
as the only source of identity; the national scale of water management as 
`necessary'; a strong and centralized state as ` legitimate'; legal precedents for 
the use of state apparatus for surveillance, discipline, and control over water 
resources; and, consequently, a form of citizenship that is seen as at once 
heroic and disciplined. (Alatout, 2008, p.959) 
The first step towards managing water resources was the legislation of The Water Law. 
2.1.1 The Water Law 
A central shift in dealing with water management was with the legislation of the Water Law 
in 1959, establishing that all the water resources in the country are publicly owned. This 
removed all private or collective property rights over water resources. 
“Chapter One: Preliminary 
Water resources and purpose thereof Definition: 
1. The water resources in the State are public property; they are subject to the control 
of the State and are destined for the requirements of its inhabitants and for the 
development of the country. 
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What are water resources: 
2. For the purposes of this Law, "water resources" means springs, streams, rivers, 
lakes and other currents and accumulations of water, whether above ground or 
underground, whether natural, regulated or made, and whether water rises, flows or 
stands therein at all times or intermittently, and includes drainage water and sewage 
water. 
Private person's right to water: 
3. Every person is entitled to receive and use water, subject to the provisions of this 
Law. 
Relationship between land and water: 
4. A person's right in any land does not confer on him a right in a water resource 
situated therein or crossing it or abutting thereon; but the provision of this section 
shall not derogate from the right of any person under section 3. 
Water resource must not be depleted: 
5. A person's right to receive water from a water resource is valid so long as the receipt 
of water from that water resource does not lead to the salination or depletion thereof. 
Linking of right:  
6. Every right to water is linked to one of the to purpose water purposes enumerated 
hereunder; the right to water ceases upon the cessation of the purpose. The purposes 
are: 
(1) domestic purposes; (2) agriculture; (3) industry; (4) handicraft, commerce and 
services; (5) public services. 
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Applicability 
7. For the purposes of this Law, it shall be immaterial whether a right to water was 
created by law including this Law or by agreement or custom or in any other manner, 
or whether it was created before or after the coming into force of this Law.” (Water 
Law, 1959) 
In addition to the recognition of water as a public natural resource, the law established the 
centralized structure to manage it.  Under the 1959 law, the Water Authority, a central 
government agency, was created alongside a public planning design company- Tahal and an 
infrastructure building and water supply company- Mekorot. Together, the three agencies, 
were responsible for the monitoring, regulation, and allocation of water; how much water 
will be extracted in each time period, from each source, and how much water each user will 
get in this time period. It established a ‘natural monopoly’, as described by Feitelson (2013). 
A comprehensive metering system was put in place, and a company established by the pre-
state Zionist organizations (Mekorot) was designated to operate this system. The decision-
making process was largely opaque as no record of it was made available to the public 
(Feitelson, 2013). In addition, water is considered a security issue since it is a scarce natural 
resource in the region, and many water sources are shared internationally. Therefore, any 
public discussion through the media about amounts or projects had to pass governmental 
censorship.  
2.2 The Spatial Planning of Israel 
Through the two stages described above (pre and post-state in sections 1 to 2.1), water 
discourses of abundance and scarcity were mobilized for the building of the national Jewish 
home. First, it legitimized Jewish immigration to Palestine, the building of new settlements, 
and selected agricultural development. Later, the discourse around water management 
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constructed the centralized water management system and infrastructure that was an 
essential step of building the modern country and connecting all its segments into one 
nation. The newly developed centralized water management system enabled control over 
the allocation of water resources to support strategic land-use planning patterns in building 
the nation. This section introduces Israeli spatial planning strategies (sub-sections 2.2.1 to 
2.2.6) that prioritized national and security objectives, treated land as a frontier, and 
disregarded natural resources capacity. Within a few decades, those spatial planning 
strategies, that required a supply of water and a highly developed infrastructure system, led 
to over-exploitation of water resources and drought. 
** 
Within a few years of its establishment, the state of Israel claimed ownership over 93% of 
the land within its pre-1967 borders. Most of those lands were abandoned Arab property15, 
lands that were not previously claimed (according to the British law of ownership claiming), 
or lands that were owned by organizations associated with the pre-state Yishuv such as the 
Jewish National Fund (JNF)16 (Evans,2006). This high percentage of nationally owned lands 
enabled planning to be tightly regulated by Israeli government policy (Orenstein and 
Hamburg, 2009) and allowed for implementation of the national strategic objectives (Evans, 
2006). 
In 1949, one year after the establishment of the state of Israel, the Prime Minister, Ben-
Gurion, presented the Defense Service Law to the Parliament. This law included several 
                                                 
15 The Absentees’ Property Law, 1950: “Defines persons who were expelled, fled, or who left the country after 29 November 
1947, mainly due to the war, as well as their movable and immovable property (mainly land, houses and bank accounts 
etc.), as “absentee”.  Property belonging to absentees was placed under the control of the State of Israel with the Custodian 
for Absentees’ Property. The Absentees’ Property Law was the main legal instrument used by Israel to take possession of 
the land belonging to the internal and external Palestinian refugees, and Muslim Waqf properties across the state.” (Adalah, 
2019) 
16 The JNF was established in 1901 during the 5th Zionist Congress. It was responsible for purchasing land in Palestine to 
manage it and distribute it to the Jewish immigrants. (Amir and Rechtman, 2006) later, it was re-established as an Israeli 
company (named KKL- Keren Kayemet Leyesrael) and most of its land were transferred to be managed by the Israel Land 
Administration governmental agency (ILA). Today JNF-KKL owns %13 of the total area of Israel.   
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civilian components that included absorbing immigrants and spreading the Jewish 
population through the county. The strategic goals were to address demographic liabilities 
in key areas and hostile border regions (Evans, 2006). Hence, the land-use planning policies 
prioritized Jewish population distribution across the country (Evans, 2006, Orenstein and 
Hamburg, 2009, Newman 1989, and Weizman, 2004). The dispersal policies were designed 
to populate lands, fortify borders against neighbors, preempt efforts of Palestinian refugees 
to reclaim the land, and secure land holdings for Jewish immigrants against the Palestinians 
citizens of Israel (Orenstein and Hamburg, 2009).  
This political-demographic spatial planning approach was rooted in Zionist settlement 
policies17 and continued after 1948. It included implementation measures such as a 
population dispersal policy, a low-density pattern of settlement, agricultural settlements, 
border settlements, settling in the desert, developing industry in the periphery, settling 
immigrants according to national priorities, etc. The following sub-sections will describe 
some of the implementation measures undertaken as part of the spatial planning in Israel.  
2.2.1 Blooming the Negev 
The Negev (Al-Naqab), a desert and semidesert region in southern Israel (see Figure 6), 
occupies nearly two-thirds of Israel's land area (21,671 km2) (Portnov and Safriel, 2004), with 
an average rainfall of 50–250 mm per year (Orenstein and Hamburg, 2009). The Negev area 
is bordered by Jordan to the east, the Red Sea to the South, and Sinai Peninsula of Egypt to 
the west. It also shares borders with the West Bank and Gaza strip.18 
 
                                                 
17 The desire to spread the Jewish population to claim territory was a main determinant of the Zionist settlements pattern, 
especially after the1937 British Royal (Peel) Commission Plan for the partition of Palestine. When the Zionist leadership 
realized that the borders of the emerging Jewish state would be decided based on the Jewish settlements’ locations 
(Orenstein and Hamburg, 2009)  
18 Those are the 1948 borders of the Negev. Today’s Israel’s borders with the West Bank are not defined. 
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Figure 6: The Negev, the southern district of Israel.  
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Southern_District_in_Israel.svg 
 
Before 1948, approximately 100,000 Bedouin lived in the area. During the 1948 war, the vast 
majority of them were displaced or expelled (Orenstein and Hamburg, 2009) and only around 
11,000 remained within the new declared borders of the state of Israel (Abu Ras, 2012). 
Although the region was populated, it was viewed by the Zionist leaders, as a barren 
wasteland that lacked, according to Ben-Gurion, “Jews and water” (Lolordo, 1998). 
Ben- Gurion saw the settling and the “blooming” of the Negev as a national, security, and 
economic mission for stabilizing and protecting the Jewish state. As such, the empty desert 
was conceived as a security threat to the new state (Alatout, 2008) as well as a fear of 
demographic threat to national sovereignty and takeover of state land by the local Bedouin 
population (Orenstein and Hamburg, 2009).  
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Ben-Gurion was among the most important Zionist leaders to stress towards settling the 
Negev, arguing that “it is in the Negev that the creativity and pioneer vigor of Israel shall be 
tested”, and that it is “one of the Jewish nation's safe-havens.” In his article “Southward”, 
that he wrote in 1956, he argued that the Negev was the place where the Hebrew nation 
was born. He referred to the biblical stories of Abraham story and believed that the ancient 
biblical injunction was also relevant in the days of the New Israel; He starts his article with 
the biblical phrase: “O mortal, set your face toward Teman, and proclaim to Darom, and 
prophesy against the brushland of the Negev.” 19 He adds that the best scientific, educational 
and pioneering forces should be directed to the Negev (Kam, 2012). 
In the article he stresses that the command shall be to move “Southward”; “to divert the 
land’s water and rainfall southward, to send the pioneering youth and the new immigrants 
southward, to allocate development budget southward […] to place a number of research 
and science institutes that deal with the knowledge of the land […] southward […] to be able 
to fertilize and bloom the lands of the South.” (Kam, 2012)  
The political-demographic conditions in this dryland region, combined with its place in the 
mythical homeland, pose perceived or concrete challenges to central government 
sovereignty (Orenstein et al., 2011). Thus, Ben-Gurion’s dream of the Negev becomes a 
national Jewish dream, one that requires a particular form of strategic planning and 
management to be achieved. This dream was promoted as a national goal; See, for example, 
the poster of JNF in Figure 7 promoting the idea of “blooming” the Negev and water 
diversion, with an image of a pipeline and desert landscape becoming green.  
                                                 
19  Darom, Tema, and Negev mean South. 
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Figure 7: JNF poster: "The vision of the Negev will be established: Redemption and water to the barren 
wasteland”. 1950s. 
Source: sharonambar.com 
 
By 1961 there were 73 Jewish settlements in the Negev, and a network of Jewish 
development towns and collective agriculture settlements were established in the northern 
Negev (Orenstein and Hamburg, 2009). By 1970, the regional development plans for the 
Negev focused on industrial development and encouraged bringing population to the region 
through the establishment of high-tech industry, army relocation, education, and tourism 
(Orenstein and Hamburg, 2009). Within the first decade of the establishment of the state of 
Israel the Bedouin community shifted from being 98% of the Negev population in 1948, to 
only 21% in 1961 (see Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: Population of the Negev (1948-2006). 
Source: (Orenstein. et al., 2011) 
 
2.2.2 Agriculture and Rural Development 
Agricultural development was encouraged during the early Jewish immigration to Palestine. 
Before the establishment of the state of Israel, agriculture aligned with the Zionist ideology 
of rebuilding a Jewish identity that is tied to working the soil. Furthermore, agricultural 
development policies aligned with the defense strategy of land control (Evans, 2006). After 
Israeli independence, agriculture was seen as the primary means to providing employment 
for the large immigration wave (one million within three years) seeking food security and 
establishing control over land to prevent a return to the 1947 UN partition lines20 (Feitelson, 
2013). 
The Zionist movement, and later on the dominant labor party in the Israeli government have 
remained strongly committed to a rural ideal and promoted it as a pillar of national pride 
(See the posters in  Figure 9 and Figure 10)   
                                                 
20 Israel has declared its borders in 1948 on a larger area compared to what the UN partition plan suggested. As shown in 
the two maps on 1947 and 1948 in Figure 1. 
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Figure 9: "The Glory and Richness of Our Country" - Poster by the Minister Office of Labor and Construction. 1950. 
Source: The National Library of Israel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: JNF Poster. 1939. 
Source: JNF 
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The Defense Service Law (see p.#) established the Culture and Welfare Department of the 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) that provided agricultural planning as part of military training. 
The main goal of this training was to direct demobilized soldiers, at the end of the war, into 
frontier settlements. Between 1948 and 1949, 39 agricultural settlements were established 
by the Palmach, an elite fighting force of the underground army of the Yishuv, that later 
became a division within the IDF. By 1952, demobilized soldiers founded another 14 
agricultural settlements (Evans, 2006, P.582). 
Both the national building motive that promoted dispersal policy, and the Zionist rural 
development portrayal led to the establishment of several hundred cooperative and 
communal rural settlements, distributed as widely as possible within Israel (Katz and Tal, 
2013). Only between 1947 and 1956, 360 new rural communities were already established 
(Kellerman, 1993, P.68). Bound to the geopolitical motive, the agricultural land was 
distributed across the country. Border regions were a desired destination, see for example 
the large agricultural parcels covering the border’s area with Gaza strip (see Figure 11) in 
comparison with Gaza strip’s spatial pattern. Another example is the buffer zone agricultural 
zone in the Jordan Valley between the West Bank and Jordan as part of Allon Plan2122 (see 
Figure 12). 
This strategy for distributing the agricultural lands resulted in the fact that most of the lands 
that needed irrigation are in the water-scarce south, where local resources are insufficient 
(Feitelson, 2013).  
                                                 
21 Allon Plan was drafted by the Israeli minister Yigal Allon following the 1967 six-days war, among other things it suggested 
a partition of the West Bank between Israel and Jordan and an annexation of the Jordan Valley. 
22 See also, the Pithat Shalom project of the early 1980s. The project promoted rural development along the northern 
portion of the Israel-Sinai border, in the dry south.  
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Figure 11: The agricultural land in the border region between Gaza and Israel, 2019.  
Source: Google Earth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The Jordan Valley land distribution. 
Source: UN/OCHA/B’TSELEM 
 28 
 
Agriculture was, and continued to be, the largest sector in terms of water consumption. In 
Figure 13 you may see years in which the sector of agriculture consumed around 90% of the 
total water consumption. In Error! Reference source not found. we can see that it continued t
o be the largest sector, although there is a  dip in the chart due to technological development 
in agriculture and the increased uptake of the ‘modern lifestyle’ which has  increased 
household consumption. In 2016, the agriculture sector consumed about 57% of the water 
consumed in Israel23). The agricultural expansion policy did not align with the nature of the 
water-scarce area, however, the provision of water to agriculture was achieved mainly due 
to the public ownership of water resources and the construction of the NWC (diverting water 
from the north to the south, as will be described in section 2.3) around which the water 
system is built (Kislev, 2013). 
Within this national-planning level, those agricultural settlements got the significant 
attention of planners and politicians, received generous land, water, and budget allocations. 
(Evans, 2006) 
  
                                                 
23 According to Israel’s Water Authority’s Survey 
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Figure 13: Water for irrigation as percentage of total supply (1954-1998). 
Source: Sitton (2000) 
 
 
Table 1: Water consumption is Israel in million m3. 
 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation 
 
2.2.3 Dispersal Policy and the Development Towns   
The dispersal planning policy shaped the spatial pattern of Israeli settlements across the 
country. While continuing with the rural Jewish settlement pattern, the Sharon Plan of 
195024 proposed the dispersal of Development Towns (Orenstein and Hamburg, 2009). 
                                                 
24 Sharon’s plan was a national-level master plan of Israel 
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‘Development Towns’ is the term for the type of settlements that were built during the 
1950s, based on the Sharon Plan, to meet the needs of the large immigration wave that 
doubled the population of Israel within a few years. The total population grew from being 
872,700 right after the war of 1948 to reach 2,150,400 by 1960 (see Figure 31). The 
government directed immigrants to these areas as an integral part of a national plan for 
population dispersal across the national territory (Evans,2006). 
26 out of the 29 development towns were built during the 1950s and 1960s, 24 of them were 
in the periphery; 13 in the southern periphery (see Figure 14). Those towns achieved the 
strategic goal of increasing the Jewish population in the periphery. As a result, by 20 years, 
the Jewish population in the two peripheral districts grew from 8.5% to 21.2% of the total 
population. In the Negev, the southern peripheral district, it grew even more dramatically 
from 0.9% to 11.2% of the total population (Evans,2006, p.586). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Israeli Development Towns (the Non-Black squares). 
Source: Yiftachel and Tzfadia, 2004 
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The national objectives behind the dispersal policy were not accomplished by significant 
economic absorption opportunities. Many of the peripheral settlements were and continued 
to be reliant on heavy subsidies for their creation and continued viability (Orenstein and 
Hamburg, 2009). By the mid-1960s, around 200,000 immigrants were brought to the 
development towns. The vast majority of them were Mizrahi Jews (Eastern Jews- immigrants 
from Arab and Muslim countries) who are now living largely in rural settlements or older 
towns and segregated from other established Jewish groups (Yiftachel and Tzfadia, 2004) 
The development towns were far from major cities and did not rely on agriculture like the 
rural development areas. As Evans (2006) writes, the government sometimes used heavy-
handed methods to bring the immigrants to settle in development towns. Immigrants who 
refused to move to the designated areas faced the possible loss of housing and employment 
benefits (Figure 15 Shows Mitzpe Ramon, a development town in the Negev that was built 
for the new immigrants but was not yet developed. Figure 16 shows Arad’s city in the Negev 
today). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Mitzpe Ramon. 
Source: Israel’s Government Press Office  
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Figure 16: Arad. 
Source: Neukoln - User on Wikipedia   
 
2.2.4 Forests Planting 
Another major land use practice that characterized Israeli spatial planning and transformed 
the natural landscape of Palestine was the planting of forests (Eid and Haller, 2018), which 
was a tool of “renewing Israel's battered Mediterranean landscape” (Ginsberg, 2000). By 
1995, approximately 7.4% of the land surface of Israel, within its pre-1967 borders, was 
covered with forest. Among those 160,600 hectares of forest, 90,000 hectares (%4.2 of the 
total surface of the country) are planted forests (Amir and Rechtman, 2006) (see Table 2). 
Afforestation activities have been undertaken by the JNF (see p.#) that has planted more 
than 240 million trees in Israel. Between 1950 and 1966, the forested area was multiplied 
tenfold, from 3,326 hectares to 34,600 hectares (Ginsberg, 2000).Figure 17 shows the 
distribution and the coverage of JNF’s forests across the country. 
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Table 2: Distribution of vegetation types, planted forests and areas managed by KKL (JNF). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Amir and Rechtman, 2006) 
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Figure 17: JNF's forests area in 2013. 
Source: Society for the Protection of Nature in Israe 
l 
This rapid afforestation by the JNF served to realize the goals of territorial occupation and 
control that the Zionist movement, and later the Israeli government, had. Its main goals were 
protecting acquired lands, empowering the new immigration waves with a source of 
employment, and establishing security buffers (Amir and Rechtman, 2006, and Kliot, 1992). 
This ideology has driven the geographic expansion of the forests until the mid-1960, creating 
many strips of forests along different borders (Kliot, 1992). In addition, forests were a land 
use tool of control within the newly-drawn borders of Israel; to prevent Bedouins, for 
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example, from expanding their borders (Kliot, 1992). They also concealed “the remains of 
the demolished Palestinian villages” (Katorza, the responsible for signage in JNF quoted in 
Bronstein Aparicio, 2014), since two thirds of JNF’s sites cover demolished Palestinians 
villages that were demolished during the 1948 war by Zionist paramilitary organizations.  
Until today, forests are still planted as security buffers in different regions, see for example 
a martial celebration of the JNF’s project “Security Afforestation in Gaza Envelope” in 2011 
in Figure 18.  
 
Figure 18: A celebration of the JNF’s project “Security Afforestation in Gaza Envelope” in 2011. 
The ecological aspects of the forests’ plantation were to prevent water and wind erosion 
(Kliot, 1992). 
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2.2.5 Drying Swamps 
More than 97% of Israel’s natural wetlands were filled to free up land for agriculture and 
settlements (Katz and Tal, 2013). Zionist land agencies, before and after the establishment 
of the Israeli government, worked on “swamp draining” that left the country with only 850 
hectares of natural reserves out of 28,000 hectares that existed in the beginning of the 20th 
century (Gvirtzman, 2015). Planting forests, with Eucalyptus trees that were imported from 
Australia, was the main instrument for draining the wetlands.   
Among those projects, the draining of the Hula Valley’s lake and marsh, north of the Sea of 
Galilee, was a powerfully symbolic national enterprise, celebrated with patriotic fervor. It 
freed around 6,000 hectares for agriculture and settlements in the 1950’s but created, within 
a few years, an environmental problem that affected underground water and the water in 
the Sea of Galilee (Greenberg, 1993). 
2.2.6 Individual Farms 
Consistent with land control and population dispersal motives, public lands were allocated 
to individuals to establish “individual farms” mainly in the Negev but also in the Galilee. 
These farms were seen as a “device to preserve the country’s public land in the Negev and 
the Galilee” (Israeli Government Report quoted in Tzfadia, 2010), whose survival economy 
was based on agriculture and tourism. Figure  19  Figure  19 is an example of a farm in the 
desert, a large area owned by one family that mainly includes agriculture, their house, and a 
few more rooms for guests (upper left of the photo). Today there are approximately 100 
individual farms that cover an area of 10,000 hectares (0.5% of Israel’s area) (Tzfadia, 2010), 
and some are located in the most environmentally sensitive lands, according to the Society 
for the Protection of Nature in Israel (Figure  20  shows the dispersal distribution of the farms 
and their location in the most environmentally sensitive areas in green).  
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Figure  19 : Carmey Avdat individual farm owned by Yizrael’s family.  
Source: Carmey Avdat Website 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  20 : The distribution of individual farms (in purple) in relation to enviromental sensitivity of the area 
(With dark green indicating the higher level of sensitivity). 
Source: Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel 
 
  
 38 
 
2.3 The National Water Carrier  
To ensure that the spatial planning strategies can take place and water can reach all the new 
settlements of the dispersed pattern, a centralized national water system was needed. The 
largest Israeli national water infrastructure project is the National Water Carrier (NWC), that 
started operating in 1964. It was the physical product of the nationalization of water 
resources and a centralized water management policy that emerged amidst the discourse 
around water scarcity.  This section describes the project of the NWC and the Saline Water 
Carrier sub-project (in sub-section 2.3.1). 
Simcha Blass’s plan (see page#), Lowdermilk JVA proposal (see page#), and later, the national 
water plan in 1950, laid the foundation for the building of the NWC. The NWC, as seen in 
those plans, was supposed to convey water from the water-rich north to the dry south. 
However, the Litani River (in Lebanon) that was to be diverted, according to some of the 
plans, did not fall within Israeli borders. Instead, construction work began in 1953 to divert 
water directly from the upper Jordan River at Daughters of Jacob Bridge. Fire fights occurred 
between Israel and Syria (that shared the Jordan river with Israel before Israel occupied the 
Golan Heights) and complaints against Israel were filed at the United Nation, until the plan 
was altered (Kantor, 2001). Finally, the NWC plan diverted water from the Sea of Galilee lake 
in the North, through Sapir pumping station, to the northern part of the Negev in the South 
(see Figure 21). Using electricity, water was pumped from the lower altitude of the lake (212 
meters below sea level) and carried over 130 km to the southern part of the country (Schwarz 
et al., 2015), reaching levels of 150m above sea level (see Figure 22). By the completion of 
the NWC in 1964, about 400 million cu.m of water (out of 500 million cu.m available) from 
the Sea of Galilee was being pumped; 80 percent of the water was allocated for agriculture, 
and 20 percent for drinking water (Kantor, 2001)25. By blocking the outlet of the lake towards 
                                                 
25 This percentage has changed over the years with the changes in water consumption and with the desalination projects.  
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the south, Degania Dam stopped the flow of water into the Lower Jordan River toward the 
Dead Sea and enabled pumping water from the Sea of Galilee and this became the major 
fresh water source (300 mcm/year) (Schwarz et al., 2015). 
Other water works in Israel, including pumping water from main aquifers and streams, were 
combined into the NWC to create a networked infrastructure with giant pipes, canals, 
tunnels, reservoirs and pumping stations, all controlled by Mekorot as one centralized 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: The National Water Carrier plan. 
Source: AdamHej on Wikipedia  
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Figure 22: National Water Carrier- Longitudinal section. 
Source: (Sitton,2002)  
 
The NWC, was funded by the reparation agreement with the postwar West German 
government, by donations from American Jews, and from financial support from the 
American government (Seigel, 2015). It was nationally celebrated, through all its stages, as a 
demonstration of the powerful newly-established country and became one of the national 
symbols of Israel (see the drawing of a water pipeline crossing agricultural lands, as a symbol 
of the NWC, printed on the five shekel currency in Figure 23) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: The NWC on the five-shekel currency. 1985. 
Source: Seigel (2015)  
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2.3.1 The Saline Water Carrier (SWC) 
The salinity of the Sea of Galilee is significantly higher than surface streams that flow to the 
lake and higher than what agricultural lands can handle (Gvirtzman, 2015). Between 1950 
and 1962 its salinity reached levels of 300- 390 (mg Cl/liter) (see Figure 24). The major source 
of the high salinity is mainly a result of saline groundwater that emerges through off-shore 
and on-shore springs along the coast of the lake. Therefore, in order to be able to consume 
the lake’s water, the water from the saline springs of the lake have to be diverted. By 1964, 
the SWC began to capture the saline springs in the west side of the lake and divert it around 
the lake to the Lower Jordan River (Rimmer,2015). This way, the salinity of the Sea of Galilee 
was decreased but the salinity of the Lower Jordan River increased instead. In addition, 
despite the diversion of saline water, the salinity of the Sea of Galilee’s water that is being 
used for agricultural use remained relatively high for agricultural usage and caused for soil 
salination across the country (see sub-section 2.5.4) 
 
 
 
Figure 24: The salinity level of the Sea of Galilee (1950-2009).  
Source: Israel Oceanographic and Limnological Research  
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2.4 Al Battouf Valley – A Story of Palestinians in the Galilee  
Orenstein and Hamburg (2009) discussed the gap between the concurrent policies of spatial 
dispersion of Jews and spatial restriction for Palestinian citizens of Israel. They argue that it 
generated significant alienation and catalyzed opposition to land-use policies within the 
community. The previous chapters described the planning policies and the waterworks that 
characterized the Israeli nation-building. In the shade of this, Palestinians were left behind. 
This section will discuss the detachment of Palestinians from their natural environment as a 
result of the Israeli nation-building project. It starts with general background about 
Palestinians in Israel (sub-section 2.4.1), and then focuses on the case study of Al Battouf 
Valley region in the Galilee (sub-sections 2.4.2-2.4.6). This case study examines the story of 
Israeli control over Palestinians as an element of building the Jewish government’s water 
projects, and the story of fertile Palestinian land that, although crossed or intersecting with 
the NWC, go neglected and unirrigated, eventually degrading into poor soils.  
2.4.1 Palestinians in Israel 
In 1948, the independence of Israel was declared after a war that ended with more than 
700,000 Palestinians expelled or fled (around 50% of the population of pre-war Palestine). 
512 villages were entirely demolished, while urban Palestine was almost entirely 
extinguished. 10 out of 11 Palestinian cities (within the geography of Israel of 1948, such as 
Haifa, Jaffa, Acre, etc.) lost their Palestinian population and parts of them were demolished 
as well (Hassan, 2018). 
Today, 70 years after, the 160,000 Palestinians (Zoubi, 2005) within the Israeli borders who 
“survived” the Nakba of 1948 are constituting 1.7 million citizens, 20.8% of the population 
in Israel (According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 2016). Most of those 
Palestinians live in 127 villages and towns, separate Palestinian-only communities (see Figure 
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25)26. These are local municipalities whose lands constitute only 3% of the lands inside Israel. 
Palestinians’ lands are private lands, whereas most of the land in Israel (93% of the state 
land) is public property, owned by the state or by the JNF. (Nassir, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Map of Arab localities, 2015. 
Source: Bolter21 on Wikipedia 
 
The Palestinians’ spaces grew in the shade of the massive nation building of the Israeli state 
that was described in previous sections. Between the years 1948 and 1968 (when most of 
the Jewish settlements and infrastructure were built) the Palestinians in Israel were under a 
military government. They were and remain the “black holes” of the Israeli planning process; 
Since 1948 those villages and towns grew informally on their private lands, and their 
population has increased by eight times without expanding their growth boundaries and 
without appropriate master plans. This was the main reason for the high-dense growth; small 
rural villages grew into densely built spaces. The Israeli government controlled these spaces 
                                                 
26 The common term that is used to refer to those localities in Israel is “Arab localities” 
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by lands’ expropriation, by building new Jewish settlements and infrastructures surrounding 
and narrowing the Palestinians settlements, and by total neglect of these places. The 
government policies, in this case, attempted to control the ethnic minority, hoping to 
prevent a serious challenge to the character or the territorial integrity of the state (Yiftachel, 
1994). The control policies, represented by planning and non-planning, typically attempt to 
retard the minority’s economic development, contain its territorial expression and exclude 
it from the state’s center of power and influence (Yiftachel, 1994). 
Although 40% of the Palestinian population before the Nakba was urbanized (Hassan, 2018), 
the vast majority of those who remained within the Israeli borders lived in villages (some of 
them are now called cities due to their population size). This shifted the remained Palestinian 
community towards an almost entirely rural society. However, the lands’ expropriation that 
resulted in narrowing the villages’ area resulted in losing agricultural lands as well as open 
public spaces for the sake of building houses, an initial need for the growing population. 
Therefore, the villages grew within their growth boundaries to become very dense spaces 
and lost their rural characteristics. Um Al Fahem, the second largest Palestinian town in 
Israel, is one example of a village that grew from 5,000 residents in 1948 into a dense town 
of 55,000 as can be seen in Figure 26.   
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Figure 26: Um Al Fahem - Second larger Palestinian town in Israel. (Taken by: Rami Jabareen) 
 
2.4.2 The Region of Al Battouf Valley 
Al Battouf Valley (Beit Netofa Valley) is a valley in the Lower Galilee region in the northern 
district of the country (see Figure 27) and it lies between Al-Shaghour Mountain (Yodfat) to 
the north and Tur’an Mountain to the south. Its lands are considered among the most fertile 
agricultural lands in the area. In order to cultivate this land, and to curb the flooding that 
occurs during the winter rains once every two years (Madar, 2008), villages were built on 
hillsides along the margins of the valley. Around the valley, there are the Arab villages Kafr 
Manda, Rumeit Heib, Rumana, Uzayr, Bu'eine Nujeidat, and Eilabun, and a Jewish Kibbutz 
Hanaton.  On the hills, there are some Jewish settlements that overlook the valley; Hararit, 
Avtalyon, Beit Rimon, and Mitspe Netofa.   
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The valley covers an area of around 4,000 hectares of agricultural lands that do not fall under 
any local jurisdiction. Around 35,0000 of them are owned by Palestinians from the near 
villages of Kfar Manda, Arraba, Sakhnin, Rumana, Uzayr, and Eilabun, and the rest were lands 
of the demolished Palestinian village Saffouri that were expropriated for the Yodfat 
cooperative Jewish settlement after the 1948 war (Madar, 2008). 
 
Figure 27: Al Battouf Valley boundaries. 
Source: (Arad et al., 2015) 
 
2.4.3 The National Water Carrier in Al Battouf Valley Region 
The NWC cuts through Al Battouf Valley region on its route from the Sea of Galilee to the 
Negev. The first tunnel along its route was constructed in 1953 under the range of hills of 
Eilabun village and is called Ya’akov Tunnel. It is an 850-meter-long tunnel with a 3-meter-
long internal diameter. The tunnel conveys the water from the open Jordan Canal to the 
open canal that crosses Al Battouf Valley- the Beit Netofa Canal (Kantor, 2001). 
 47 
 
The Beit Netofa Canal (see Figure 28) is a major 17 km long open canal on the route of the 
NWC. To dig it, the Israeli government expropriated the privately-owned fertile agricultural 
lands of the valley, owned by Palestinians residents of the near villages.  
 
Figure 28 :   The open canal crosses Al Battouf Valley.  
Source: Ashams.com 
 
The canal carries the water to the southwestern side of the valley, to the Eshkol27 reservoirs. 
There are two major reservoirs here; the first one is a "sedimentation pond" with a capacity 
of about 1.5 million cu.m of water and serves primarily a sanitary function. The second one 
is separated from the first one by a dam and holds 4.5 million cubes of water. Their main 
function is to regulate the inflow from the open canal versus the outflow into the closed 
pipeline depending on the overall water demand of the country.  
2.4.4 Kfar Manda Story 
Kfar Manda is an old village established in 1735 (Shinnawi, 2015) in the western side of Al 
Battouf valley. It is a significant location due to its fertile agricultural land and the spring that 
                                                 
27 Named after Levi Eshkol 
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lies within its boundaries. In 2017, the village’s population of 19,326 was predominantly Arab 
Muslims citizens28. In 2013, its socio-economic index was 2 out of 10 (with 1 being the 
lowest) and it was ranked 18 out of 1255 local municipalities according to its socio-economic 
index (with 1 being the lowest ranking)29.  
In the early 1950s, before the NWC project’s layout was finalized, all of Al Battouf Valley was 
to become a reservoir to hold the diverted water from the Jordan River. The Sea of Galilee 
was not part of the NWC plan yet and water was supposed to start flowing into the NWC 
from the Upper Jordan River before it reaches the Sea of Galilee. According to this initial 
plan, Kfar Manda village was to be flooded and its lands were to be expropriated to hold the 
reservoir (In Figure 29 you may see the white area depicting the proposed reservoir and that 
Kfar Manda lies within it). 
 
Figure 29: Kfar Manda Village, falling within the proposed reservoir  
Source: (Shinnaw, 2016) 
                                                 
28 CBS  
29 CBS  
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In December 1954, the villagers of Kfar Manda received eviction orders. Police forces, 
agricultural ministry officers, and technicians from Tahal arrived in the village to measure 
the houses that were supposed to be destroyed.  The villagers protested and the police fired 
live ammunition at the residents, wounded dozens of them, and arrested over 100 people. 
This event was called ‘Uri Day’, after the name of Uri Tahon, an officer of Tahal that worked 
in the Galilee region for the NWC project and was known to the villagers of the region (Zoubi, 
2005). Although the plan changed30 and Al Battouf Valley did not become a reservoir, ‘Uri 
Day’ remains vital and is known to be the first documented clash over the implementation 
of the NWC between Israelis and Palestinians.  
2.4.5 Eilabun Story 
Eilabun is a predominantly Christian Arab village in the eastern side of Al Battouf Valley with 
a population of 5,588 in 2017 (CBS). On October 30th, 1948, the village witnessed a massacre 
in which 14 young men were killed by an Israeli military group. According to the Israeli 
Defense Forces’ (IDF) archive, on October 13th, 1948, an order was issued to the military 
regional divisions urging them to "do all you can for an immediate and quick cleansing of all 
the occupied territories from all the hostile elements.  According to orders, you should help 
the residents to leave the occupied territories” (Zreiq, 2007). Residents of Eilabun village 
were hiding in the church when in the early morning the military group forced them out to 
the main square of the village, randomly picked a number of their young men, and killed 
them. The rest of the residents were forced to walk 150 km to the Palestinian refugee camp 
in Lebanon where they stayed. Two weeks after, another massacre happened with Al 
                                                 
30 Due to the soil type of Al Battouf Valley that enables water to percolate through (Zoubi, 2005), which means the loss of 
the quantity of surface water to groundwater. Also, the international agreements that prevented Israelis from diverting 
water directly from the Upper Jordan River led to the pumping from the Sea of Galilee lake which is considered a reservoir 
by itself.  
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Mawassi tribe, a Bedouin tribe who lived near Eilabun in Al Battouf Valley. The IDF executed 
14 men in the valley and expelled their families as well.  
Later on, after the massacre was revealed by those who survived, letters were sent to the 
UN, Eilabun village got a special permit to come back to their village. People started another 
journey walking back from Lebanon to Eilabun after few months.  
A few years after the event, Eilabun’s agricultural lands were expropriated for establishing 
Tsalmon Reservoir (part of the NWC); “Those lands were planted with fruit trees, apples, and 
peaches. Uri 31, who was a good friend of many people in the village, told us that Mekorot 
wants to buy our lands and we should all go there. Then, Mekorot suggested buying the land 
and for those who did not want to sell, they said that it is not possible and that they will put 
the money in the bank for them. So, this reservoir was built on our lands” (Mattar interview, 
2019). Many hectares of lands were taken for the project, and the tunnel was drilled 
underneath the village’s hills. A group of men from Eilabun (and other villages) even became 
laborers for the project, “We lost everything, we came back to find nothing here, I even 
didn’t ask I just wanted to get my daily living. We knew that they are taking water to the 
Negev, that was all we knew.” (Mattar interview, 2019). 
2.4.6 The Agricultural Lands and the Canal  
Most of the agricultural lands within Al Battouf Valley, around 2,800 hectares (Jarbouni, 
2018), are owned by the residents of Sakhnin and Arraba, two Arab villages32. Beit Netofa 
Canal, the open canal that crosses the valley from east to west cuts through their land at the 
beginning of the 1960s and resulting in the second documented clash between Palestinians 
from the military-governed villages and the Israeli government around the NWC project. In 
                                                 
31 Which most probably the same Uri from Tahal.  
32 Today, Sakhnin and Arraba are among the largest Arab cities of the Galilee with Christian and Muslim residents. Sakhni 
populated 30,548 in 2017 and Arraba populated 24,972 (CBS).  
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1961, the Ministry of Finances issued two announcements (February 23rd and March 20th, 
1961) declaring: “The Israeli government will expropriate lands from Al Battouf Valley of 93-
meter width and 17 km length, of which a 12 km portion falls within lands owned by Arab 
peasants from Sakhnin and Arraba” (Zoubi, 2005). After a series of protests and objections 
by people from the villages, violent clashes started in June 1962 when Mekorot’s bulldozers 
started digging through land. The local people prevented the continuation of the work by 
blocking the bulldozers ways with their bodies, until Mekorot got a court approval in August 
and continued the work secured by police forces (Zoubi, 2005). Dozens of people were 
detained during those events and some landowners were temporary exiled outside the 
region until Mekorot finished the work (Jarbouni Interview, 2019).  
In 1964, the NWC was officially opened and started operating. Jewish settlements all across 
the country received water and their agricultural land received irrigation, but not the 
agricultural lands of Al Battouf Valley. Even today, the agricultural lands of the valley that 
are owned by Palestinians do not receive water for irrigation, but the lands owned by Jewish 
people, or the seized forests surrounding the valleys receive subsidized water for irrigation.  
The ownership of the agricultural lands of the valley remained within Palestinian families 
and, with time, land became better subdivided such that the valley is now owned by 5,000 
different owners and divided into small parcels of 0.5-2 hectares each (Kivun, 2008). 
Al Battouf Valley is among the last surviving agricultural landscape of small parcels in Israel, 
that are cultivated with diverse crops creating a colorful agricultural landscape. Today, 
despite the area’s fertile soil, the valley’s agricultural lands are not irrigated and do not have 
a stormwater drainage system. The farmers still rely on rainfed agriculture that cannot 
provide sufficient water to grow crops that could compete with the intensively irrigated and 
subsidized large-scale agriculture in the Jewish settlements. The absence of a drainage 
system, which requires governmental approval and cannot be constructed individually, 
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leaves around two-thirds of the valley’s lands flooded every other year (Jarbouni interview, 
2019). In addition, the shift to using chemical fertilizers and the absence of a drainage system 
is causing soil salinization and threatening the quality of the soil (Tarabeih interview, 2019). 
For decades, farmers have been fighting to get irrigation pipelines and to construct a 
drainage system but their demands have been ignored and denied by the different 
governmental ministries. Today the farmers are faced with the ecological and environmental 
preservation argument which has become the government’s defense for not irrigating the 
lands and not building a drainage system. The main concerns the government is raising are 
the unique and rich environmental qualities of the flooded areas, along with the richness of 
species in the traditional agriculture lands that have not transitioned to the agricultural 
monocultures of the irrigated Jewish settlements.  
During the era of expanding the intensively irrigated agricultural lands, Palestinian 
agricultural lands were left behind and became economically non-profitable. Today, with 
raised environmental awareness and concern, those non-profitable lands are a target for 
preservation. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, and The Fund for the Protection of Open Spaces33 are proposing a plan to 
preserve the traditional agricultural style and to promote tourism in the valley.  Residents of 
the nearby Arab villages and towns are no longer benefiting from their agriculture lands. In 
Sakhnin and Arraba, no more than 10% of the residents work in agriculture, compared to 
90% in the past (Kivun, 2008, p.8). This transition of lifestyle has created many social 
transitions and conflicts as well; farmers have begun to sell their lands or turn them into 
residential parcels, losing their cultural connectivity to their land and their natural 
environment, in exchange for the dense and fast growing cemented villages.  
                                                 
33 An agency under Israel Land Authority  
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The national government control over nature has limited the local people’s agency over their 
lands and the nature that they live with. The practice and culture of agriculture has 
disappeared from people’s daily life; even their livestock have been prohibited from what 
used to be common open lands but were seized and are now, JNF’s lands. This alienation 
from nature is not a unique story to Al Battouf Valley, but true to most of the Palestinian 
rural villages.  In 2008, only %12 of the agricultural lands owned by Palestinians in Israel were 
irrigated. In 2002, only %2.2 of the freshwater allocated for agriculture were for lands owned 
by Palestinians. (Kivun, 2008) 
Ironically, the beautiful landscape of the colorful parcels of Al Battouf (see Figure 30) are 
overlooked by the Jewish settlements on the surrounding mountains, creating a new source 
of tourist entertainment and profit.  
 
Figure 30: Lowdermilk lookout point. JNF 
Source: www.eyarok.org.il 
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2.5 The Drought and Nature Transformation  
The technologically advanced water projects in Israel and the seemingly successful water 
policies, together with the national spatial planning strategies and rapid demographic 
growth (see Figure 31), depleted the available natural water resources, almost entirely, by 
the beginning of the 1970s (Zaslavsky, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Population in Israel (in millions)(1948-2018)  
Source: CBS, 2018 
 
Essentially, the scarcity discourse that was applied to establish the national institutions and 
the centralized system turned into an actual drought following the early overexploitation of 
surface and groundwater resources.  
The increased stress on the water system beginning from the mid-1960s34 could not be 
hidden, but the many official reports’35 and experts’ warnings did not have any impact on 
the policies. Researchers partially attributed that to the significance control of the 
agricultural sector, the highest consumer of water, over water policymakers (Feitelson, 
2013). 
The water management policies in Israel have been criticized for being outdated, inefficient, 
and environmentally detrimental (Feitelson, 2013). Dery and Salomon, quoted in Feitelson 
                                                 
34 The beginning of operating the NWC 
35 Such as the State Comptroller report in 1966 forewarning the excessive groundwater abstraction (Feitelson, 2013) 
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(2013) argued that it became increasingly apparent that overdrawing of water resources in 
the mid-1980s was a governing policy and not an aberration. Environmental concerns were 
overlooked for decades (see Figure 32) and by prioritizing demographic and national security 
concerns the damage could be irreversible.   
 
 
Figure 32: Policy Paradigm in Israel.   
Source: Orenstein and Hamburg, 2009 
 
In this section, I will introduce the environmental effects that have happened over the 
decades of water overexploitation. I will show how water policy, serving the national project, 
transformed the natural environment and dramatically changed the landscape.  
2.5.1 The Sea of Galilee Lake 
The overexploitation of surface and underground water had a very visible impact on the Sea 
of Galilee’s water level and on its quality. The lake’s levels were almost continuously 
dropping since the beginning of operating the NWC, reaching a lowest peak level of -214 
meters in 2001 (see Figure 33). During the mid-1980s the water’s level dropped below the 
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lower “red line”36 prescribed for the Sea of Galilee and the Mountain Aquifer. However, the 
water Commissioner lowered the “red line” to the level of the intake for the NWC (Feitelson, 
2013). 
 
Figure 33: Sea of Galilee water levels from 1967 to 2011  
“as measured by the Hydrological Service of Israel. The vast changes in the water level over the last 20 years are noted, 
including the minimum water level of –214.87 at December, 2001. The dashed red lines mark the upper and lower “red 
lines” as decided by the Water Authority.” 
Source:( Tibor et al., 2012) 
 
Today, the low water levels revealed a large island near the lake’s southern shore (see 
Figure 34) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Island in The Sea of Galilee, 2018. 
Source: Yuval Gassar, Haaretz 
                                                 
36 The concept of the “red line” was established in 1960 and it functions as a warning tool. It indicates the lowest water 
level administratively allowed to operate in the lake. By reaching the lower red line the situation requires re-examination 
of the water pumping management system in Israel as a whole, and in the Sea of Galilee’s basin in particular (Feitelson et 
al., 2005). The “black line” indicates a level of irreversible ecological damage 
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Despite the fact that climate change has contributed to rising temperatures and rainfall 
levels in the area, studies show that this is not the primary reason for the significant decrease 
in the lake’s water levels. There are no decreasing trends in the inflow from the headwaters 
of the Upper Jordan River (in Lebanon) and the temperature changes in the basin are too 
small to explain the magnitude of the streamflow decreases (Wine et al., 2019). What Wine’s 
et al (2009) study reveals is that the decrease in discharge of the Upper Jordan River 
correlated with a period of expanding irrigated agriculture, doubling groundwater pumping 
rates within the basin, and increasing of the area of standing and impounded waters.  
2.5.2 The Dead Sea 
The Dead Sea is a salt-lake bordered by Jordan to the East and Israel and the West Bank to 
the West (see Figure 6). It is the earth’s lowest elevation on land with a unique ecological 
environment. The Dead Sea’s main water source is the Lower Jordan River that flows from 
the Sea of Galilee southwards. This flow was blocked by the Degania Dam in the southern 
outlet of the Sea of Galilee, and together with the over-pumping of water, the streamflow 
was stopped in the lower portion of the Jordan River – Israel’s only river. The flow declined 
by over 95% relative to the natural flow (Katz and Tal, 2013). 
As a result, the Dead Sea is shrinking at an alarming rate, about 3.3 feet per year, according 
to the environmentalist group EcoPeace Middle East (Wehelie, 2016). The surface area of 
the Sea has decreased by about a third to its current 630 km2, according to the Geological 
Survey of Israel (see the shrinking of the sea’s area within a few decades, in Figure 35). After 
water stopped reaching the southern portion of the Sea, it became entirely dry and was 
turned into an artificial lake (see Figure 36). 
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Figure 35: The Dead Sea 1931-1993.  
Source: EcoPeace Middle East 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: The Dead Sea today. 
Source: Google Earth 
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2.5.3 Aquifers and Streams  
During the first years of the country (1950–1965), the emphasis was on intensifying pumping 
by drilling numerous wells in all aquifers (Schwarz et al., 2015). Those wells were later 
connected to the NWC network and managed together with the pumping from the Sea of 
Galilee. This over pumping led to a drastic decline in aquifer levels. It resulted not just in the 
drought of the aquifers, but also in a saltwater intrusion after water had reached very low 
levels (Gvirtzman, 2015). Many pumping stations have closed due to these reasons.  
In addition, as a result of the aquifer low levels, several springs supplying the streams ceased 
to flow (Katz and Tal, 2013).   
Despite the streamflow’s ecological value, it was seen as “wasted water” during the first few 
decades of the Israeli country. They were largely denuded, polluted, and rerouted to reduce 
flood risks (Katz and Tal, 2013). This was manifested in the Water Law of 1959 that did not, 
until 2004, include “nature” under the list of uses to which water can be allocated (Feitelson, 
2013)37.  This reflected the values’ priorities that have driven the water policymakers in Israel 
that disregarded the ecological values and turned out to be detrimental to the environment 
(Katz and Tal, 2013).   
According to different studies cited in (Katz and Tal, 2013), the water flow in two-thirds of 
all springs monitored were severely reduced and/or actively witnessing declines. Some 
streams with previously constant flow became intermittent, whilst some of the intermittent 
streams ceased to flow at all. As mentioned earlier, the streamflow in the lower portion of 
the Jordan River declined by over 95% relative to natural flows. The Yarkon stream, that runs 
through Tel Aviv, the largest metropolitan area, is less than %2 of its historic flow. Out of all 
                                                 
37 Those uses included (1) household needs; (2) agriculture; (3) industry; (4) industry, commerce; and (5) public services 
(water Law 1959) 
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of Israel’s streams, only the headwaters of the Jordan River remained with significant levels 
of natural flow and a functioning natural ecosystem (Katz and Tal, 2013).   
In addition to the drought of the streams, the neglect of their value led to polluting them 
with sewage, industrial waste, trash, etc. Until today, despite the sewage treatment system, 
some streams still house decades’ worth of remains containing heavy metals and organic 
chemical compounds (Katz and Tal, 2013).   
After decades of overexploitation and ignorant water policy that focused on economic 
development, the natural water sources, both surface and underground, have been severely 
damaged. 
2.5.4 Soil Salinization 
The diversion of water from the Sea of Galilee to the south has increased the salt level in the 
groundwater of the central regions of the country. For 40 years, the NWC carried the saline 
water of the lake (around 250 (mg Cl/liter) even with the SWC) southward to the Coastal 
aquifer, raising its salinization level from 100 to 200 (mg Cl/liter) (Gvirtzman, 2015). The high 
salinity of water used for irrigation has also become a concern that is threatening the 
agricultural production (Feitelson, 2013). The soil salinization was a result of the diversion of 
saline water from the North and the use of treated sewage water in irrigated agriculture 
(discussed in chapter 3.2). 
2.5.5 The Natural Reserves   
Drainage of wetlands, expansion of agriculture, forests, urban and rural settlements, have 
decreased natural reserves from 28,000 hectares to only 850 (Gvirtzman, 2015). Moreover, 
the drought crisis has severely affected existing natural reserves. The environmental damage 
of erasing the ecological systems is sometimes irreversible. The Hula Lake drainage project 
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is one example of transferring the whole region for building peripheral settlements and 
expanding agriculture. In Hula Valley, the “agricultural development of the reclaimed land 
was unsuccessful, and soils were affected by continuous underground fires. Weathered peat 
soils, without a vegetation cover, were eroded by wind. Another ecological effect was the 
release of nutrients by the decomposing peat, with the nutrients carried by the Jordan river 
floods into the eutrophic Lake Kinneret. To prevent the natural subsidence a small shallow 
lake, 110 ha in area, and a network of canals were created in the 1990” (Inbar, 2002). 
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3. Manufactured Water 
The Sea of Galilee and the aquifers were the main two water resources used over the first 
four decades of the Israeli country. The overexploitation of those two natural water 
resources created the need for new technologies to overcome the drought and water 
scarcity (Gvirtzman, 2015). The need brought the policy makers first to start a large-scale 
wastewater treatment project in the 1990s and large-scale seawater plan in the early 2000s. 
In 2015, 62% of the water used was manufactured water, 11% from brackish water, 21% 
from sewage, and 27% from seawater (see Figure 37).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37: Where Israel’s water comes from? - Water Authority data 2015. 
Source: Seigel, 2015 p252 
 
This chapter discuss the next stage of the Israeli water projects – the manufactured water 
that continued the transformation of nature through technology in an attempt to solve the 
earlier damage. 
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3.1 Wastewater Treatment 
According to the Israeli Water Authority, today, around 75% of Israel’s wastewater is treated 
and reused again, mostly for irrigation. 135 factories are treating wastewater to provide 31% 
of the water used for irrigation and 18% of the water in general usage. 
Discussions around treating wastewater started in the early days of the establishment of 
Israel, however, after the 1980s it became “clear that without recycled water, agriculture, as 
it was then practiced, would have to come to an end in Israel” (Yossi Schreiber, a senior 
executive at the JNF, quoted in Seigel, (2015)).  
As discussed in the previous chapter (See section 2.2.2), agriculture was a vital instrument 
for the establishment of the national state, and it has strong advocates within the Israeli 
government. The Agriculture’s Water Planning Department was allocating subsidized 
freshwater for farmers since the first day of the state (Seigel, 2015). Getting rid of those 
subsidies was a political issue rather than a scientific question that targets the economic 
benefits and the natural capacity of water resources. The treated wastewater, hence, was a 
good solution to save the field of agriculture. Farmers were promised extra allocation of 
treated water for every unused unit of their freshwater allocation, of which the treated 
water was nitrogen-rich benefitting their agriculture practice (Seigel, 2015). This effectively 
shifted the main source of water for irrigation, such that by the early 2000s century, most of 
the irrigation in central and southern Israel was supplied by treated wastewater (Feitelson, 
2013).   
3.1.1 The Salt Danger  
As discussed in section 2.5.4, the diversion of saline water from the Sea of Galilee has 
resulted in soil salinization in the center and the South. The saline water that reaches the 
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houses leave them with higher salt level given the household usage, however, the sewage 
treatment plants do not remove the salt from water. Using the treated wastewater for 
irrigation has resulted in raising the salt level in the soil.  
According to Banin and Fish’s research on the Jazeel Valley, secondary salinization of 
intensively irrigated lands makes alarming suggestions of the desertification process which 
was experienced in many irrigated regions. Due to the intensive irrigation, the “recirculated 
salt — salt picked up by impounded surface water and applied to fields — increased 
significantly and in the late 1980s amounted to more than 9,000 tons Cl per year. The source 
of recirculated salts was the accumulated salts in soils and in the shallow aquifer in the valley, 
which were leached by floodwater or drained or infiltrated into reservoirs, grossly and 
adversely affecting water quality.” (Banin and Fish, 1995).  
According to Dr. Avner Zilver in his interview with NRG newspaper (Kraus, 2014), the 
wastewater usage for irrigation ruined the agricultural lands. He claims that the decades of 
soil salinization must come to an end, otherwise “we have to migrate.”  
3.1.2 Health Concerns  
According to studies quoted by Tal (2016), “sewage contains plant damaging substances such 
as Na, Cl, bicarbonate and heavy metals as well as human pathogenic bacteria which pose 
ongoing public health and agronomic challenges.” In addition, “Initial concerns associated 
with recycling sewage involved micro-organisms. Beyond affecting farmers through direct 
contact, pathogens can leave consumers exposed to produce with a range of harmful 
bacteria.” (Tal, 2016).  
Moreover, pharmaceutical products survive the treatment process as well. Concerns are 
raised regarding the role of those products after they leave human bodies. (Seigel, 2015) 
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3.2 Desalination  
“The irrigation of the desert with purified seawater will appeal a dream to many, but less 
than any other country should Israel be afraid of dreams capable of transforming the natural 
order… all that has been accomplished in this country is the result of dreams that have come 
true by virtue of vision, science, and pioneering capacity.” David Ben-Gurion, 1956 (Seigel, 
2015). Since the early days of the Israeli state, desalination was considered to achieve the 
Zionist goal of building a secure and self-sufficient economy. However, at that time, a large-
scale desalination plan was expensive and considered a theoretical solution.   
The increase in freshwater consumption in irrigation in the early 1980s, along with the 
drought of the late 1980s water levels dropped the “red lines” for the Sea of Galilee and the 
Mountain Aquifer. The debate over water policy in Israel was limited to a small technocratic 
elite for decades. However, overexploitation of freshwater resources brought the debate 
into the public sphere (Feitelson, 2013). The desalination funds, however, were blocked by 
the treasury because of the low water tariffs for agriculture and the fact that the agricultural 
lobby in the Knesset blocked all attempts to raise them. After the severe drought of 1999-
2000, a large-scale desalination plan was raised again as a realistic option (Feitelson, 2013), 
and a major shift in thinking took place in 2005 with a large investment in constructing 
seawater desalination plants (Schwarz et al., 2015), and the opening of Ashkelon plant. 
Today, Israel has 5 seawater desalination plants along the Mediterranean coast, that 
provided, by 2015, 27% of the water consumption (see figure 38.). In addition, dozens of 
Brackish water desalination plants (see Figure 38), provided by 2015 11% of the water 
consumption. Together, they provided 80% of the total industrial and household 
consumption of water in 2015, according to the Israeli Water Authority.  
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Figure 38: Water infrastructure. 
Source: Seigel, 2015  
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Conclusion 
The Israeli approach to water resources management has shifted a number of times since 
the inception of the nation-state. It started with believing in a water-rich “Palestine, land of 
promise” but soon adopted the water scarcity approach to create a state monopoly over 
water resources management. First, the Israeli state’s technological projects and its spatial 
planning overexploited natural resources creating historic drought and soil salination. The 
resulting problems of severe fresh water shortages are being solved again with technology: 
wastewater treatment and seawater desalination systems now provide water for household, 
agricultural, and industrial consumption source. 63% of the water used in Israel today is 
manufactured. 
To conclude, environmental damage and inequality are the outcomes of Israeli water 
projects since its early days. Water resource management systems benefited the privileged 
and increased the vulnerability of the underprivileged who were reliant on nature but cannot 
afford to be so anymore. 
Nature transformation and the state’s monopoly over nature has changed the face of the 
region that once provided the natural environment for Palestinian livelihoods that were 
rooted in agriculture. It detached Palestinians from the environment that structured their 
daily life, identity, social order and development opportunities.  The local knowledge of land, 
water and other natural resources is no longer relevant on territories under the employment 
of Israeli technological knowledge that have transformed the natural order. The philosopher 
of power, Michel Foucault, noted that power and knowledge are not independent entities 
but are inextricably related - knowledge is always an exercise of power and power always a 
function of knowledge. Foucault argues that there is a relationship between knowledge 
production and social power. In the context of the modern state, Foucault refers to this 
relationship as "Governmentality", the logic of government and governance in the modern 
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state. He analyzes the operations of knowledge production as a technology of governance 
that is based on arrays of data. These governance technologies are determined by existing 
power structures, that govern intervention options and the representation of realitySuch 
mechanisms allow the planner and the planning system (as a part of the state) to determine 
which local knowledge is relevant or not for policy planning. All of this has huge implications 
for the lives of people. In Israel, the loss and the disregard of local Palestinians’ knowledge 
changed their life but also resulted in critical environmental damage and change. Addressing 
environmental damage and deeply problematic water resource management strategies 
allows justice to be achieved, for Palestinians and for nature as well. 
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Interviews 
 
• Abo Marof, Abdalla (2019, January 9). Personal interview. 
• Hadefe, Waleed (2019, January 10). Personal interview. 
• Jarbouni, Ahmad (2019, January 14). Personal interview. 
• Mattar, Khalil (2019, January 14). Personal interview. 
• Tarabeih, Hussein (2019, January 3). Personal interview. 
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